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This commentary focuses upon two developments – cuts to wages supplements and an 
increase in the National Minimum Wage – announced in the first full Conservative 
government budget in Britain for 18 years. The commentary analyses these through the 
concept of predistribution and critiques of it. The commentary argues that the two 
developments can be understood as a weak version of predistribution that will reproduce and 
deepen class and gender inequalities because of their basis in retrenching collective provision 
for households living in wage poverty, while increasing the emphasis upon market 
mechanisms (wages) as the predominate means of supporting such households. 
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The focus in this commentary is upon the changes to state-sponsored wage supplements for 
low paid and under-employed workers announced in the 2015 summer budget in Britain and 
the introduction of what was argued in it to be a ‘national living wage’ (rather than using this 
term, however, this commentary refers to an increased or increasing National Minimum 
Wage [NMW]). Conceptually, the commentary locates these developments in the idea of 
predistribution and is divided into three sections. The first section outlines and discusses 
predistribution. The second section examines the developments – a residualising of wage 
supplements and increases in NMW – and the third section critically engages with these 
developments. It focuses upon two issues: relationships between wage poverty and the 
summer budget announcements and gender dimensions of the announcements. The 
commentary argues that rather than being the positive development portrayed by the 
government, the shifting nature of support for wage workers from distributive to 
predistributive mechanisms means that in the future the poorest wage workers will face even 
more precarious times because the subsistence basis of redistributive wage supplements 
cannot be replaced by predistributive increases in the NMW, which has no relationship to 
notions of household need.  
 
Predistribution 
While it is thought that the concept of predistribution was conceived by the American 
political scientist, Jacob Hacker, in Britain it has been most closely linked with a speech 
made by the then Leader of the Labour Party, Ed Miliband (2012). In it, and by comparing 
predistribution to redistribution, Miliband highlighted the former’s potential to the British 
wage structure. ‘Think about somebody working in a call centre, a supermarket, or in an old 
peoples’ home,’ Miliband (2012, p. 6) said, ‘[r]edistribution offers a top‐up to their wages. 
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Predistribution seeks to offer them more: Higher skills. With higher wages. An economy that 
works for working people.’ He went on: ‘Centre‐left governments of the past tried to make 
work pay better by spending more on transfer payments. Centre‐left governments of the 
future will have to also make work pay better by making work itself pay’ (Miliband, 2012, p. 
6). 
 
Miliband’s comments were important because they hinted that in the future wage 
work would have to be made to ‘pay better’ through the wage system, rather than through the 
payment of wage supplements (‘income transfers’) to people in low paid wage work. Hence, 
Labour’s 2015 general election manifesto argued that, if elected a Labour government would 
increase the NMW to more than £8 per hour by 2019 and through Making Work Pay 
Contracts it would encourage employers to pay a ‘living wage’ (Labour Party, 2015). In this 
context, Miliband’s comments suggested a need to rebalance the means of ‘making work pay’ 
away from state provision to the private sector via higher minimum wages and, if employers 
could be suitably incentivised, a ‘living wage’. 
 
Given such developments, it is not surprising that predistribution has been criticised 
as being a means of justifying austerity (Lansley, 2014). In addition, it is argued that there are 
several conceptualisations of predistribution. Ussher (2012), for example, describes two – 
‘important but limiting’ and ‘empowerment’ – interpretations of it. The ‘important but 
limiting’ version relates to action or interventions before the event as a means of softening 
the consequences of the operation of markets. In contrast, the ‘empowerment’ approach to 
predistribution would, Ussher (2012) suggests, allow individuals to react more positively and 
confidently to contemporary uncertainties. For Lansley (2014), a weak version of 
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predistribution would do little to address contemporary inequalities, while a ‘radical’ version 
would challenge and seek to change such inequalities.  
 
The arguments of both Ussher (2012) and Lansley (2014) raise issues related to 
minimum regulated wages. In Ussher’s (2012) account they are part of the limited version of 
predistribution, for they at least attempt to deal with ‘exploitation’ while not increasing wage 
worklessness, while for Lansley (2014) the weak version of predistribution ‘might aim 
merely to raise the floor by a little, by boosting wages at the bottom.’ In contrast, a ‘radical’ 
approach would seek to destroy disparities in income and wealth. Such an approach would 
involve more than just an increase in regulated minimum wages. That, however, was the 
approach taken by the Conservative government in the 2015 summer budget, for while it 
announced increases in the NMW, this was accompanied by a retrenchment of wage 
supplements which horizontally and vertically redistribute financial resources, and it did 
nothing to address wages at the upper end through, for example, the introduction of a 
maximum wage.  
 
From wage supplements to a ‘National Living wage’? 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer argued that the summer budget would help to move ‘Britain 
from a low-wage, high-tax, high-welfare society to a higher-wage, lower-tax, lower-welfare 
economy’ (House of Commons Debates, 2015, col. 332). To do this, he suggested three 
developments were required – to reduce spending on social security benefits, particularly 
those which act to supplement the wages of low paid workers, to reduce the amount of 
income tax paid by people in wage work and to increase the NMW so that by 2020 it would 
be the equivalent to 60 per cent of the median hourly wage (estimated to be £9.35 per hour – 




The first two of these were not particularly surprising as they denoted an extension of 
the 2010-15 Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition government’s approach. Within 
months of being constructed it had announced cuts to wage supplements (then tax credits) of 
£3.2 billion per annum and it substantially increased (by 64 percent, from £6,745 in 2010/11 
to £10,600 in 2015/16) the amount wage workers could earn before paying income tax. It was 
an adherence to economic liberalism by both the partners of the Coalition government that 
informed its desire to retrench collectively provided tax credits and to reduce personal 
taxation which it perceived as being coercively co-opted from wage working people to pay 
for engorged state benefits and services (HM Government, 2010). 
 
The most surprising aspect of the summer budget was the third development – a 
substantial increase (about 40 percent between 2015 and 2020) in the NMW. While senior 
members of the Conservative Party had expressed support for a ‘living wage’ before the 
summer budget – David Cameron, for example, described it in 2010 “as an idea ‘whose time 
has come’” (cited in Lawton and Pennycook, 2013, p. 8) – it was less than two decades ago 
that Conservative governments opposed minimum wage regulation. With the exception of the 
Agricultural Wages Board, Conservative governments abolished the Wages Councils which 
still existed in the 1990s. Conservative politicians argued regulated wages were an 
unnecessary interference in free markets and were of more benefit to higher paid workers 
through their encouragement of the re-setting of wage differentials (for example, comments 





In contrast, at the time Conservative governments preferred the payment of selective 
wage supplements (then family credit) to individual wage workers as an alternative to 
regulated minimum wages. Such an approach was held to be a means of ‘creating jobs, 
attracting inward investment and winning plaudits from foreign firms moving here [to 
Britain]’ (Peter Lilley, then Secretary of State for Social Security, House of Commons 
Debates, 1997, col. 931). Nearly two decades later there has been a volte-face in approach of 
Conservative governments, for in addition to the increase in NMW announced in the summer 
budget it also outlined savings of £3.8 billion per annum by 2020 from tax credits that 
specifically subsidise low wages (calculated from HM Treasury, 2015). 
 
The two main observations of the summer budget were that it was overly political and 
that the reduction in tax credits would disincentivise wage workless people from taking entry-
level jobs. The first observation was related to the fact that, as we have seen, in the run up to 
the 2015 General Election the Labour Party had claimed the ‘living wage’ as its policy. The 
announcement in the summer budget to increase the NMW to a higher rate than that pledged 
in the Labour Party’s 2015 election manifesto and the inclusion of ‘living wage’ in its new 
title was widely seen as a means of wrong-footing Labour. This was certainly the impression 
given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, while ignoring the social costs of his 
previous budgets – for instance, the increasing use of food banks, particularly by people in 
wage work (Cooper et al. 2014) – argued that the summer budget denoted the Conservative 
Party as ‘the party for the working people of Britain’ (House of Commons Debates, 2015, 
col. 338). 
 
The second observation related to the fact that the budget retrenched tax credits by 
attempting to focus them upon the poorest of wage poor families – by, for example, reducing 
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the level of earnings (the ‘earnings threshold’) after which tax credits are withdrawn by 40 
percent (from £6,420 to £3,850), reducing tax credits at a faster rate by increasing the taper 
(the rate at which they are withdrawn from recipients) by nearly a fifth, from 41 to 48 
percent, and halving the increase in amount by which income can rise without it having to be 
declared. The retrenchment of tax credits, however, provoked an unlikely alliance of 
resistance, including, for example, the Labour Opposition, some backbench Conservative 
MPs, the House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee (2015), the right-wing The Sun 
newspaper1 and the Resolution Foundation which produced data that suggested 3.3 million 
working households would lose an average of £1,100 in April 2016 because of the changes 
announced in the 2015 summer budget2. 
 
As a consequence of this pressure and a revised economic and fiscal forecast that 
suggested by 2020 revenues would be £27 billion higher than previously expected (OBR, 
2015b), Osborne was able to announce in the 2015 Autumn Statement that households would 
be given ‘longer to adjust to the transition to a higher wage, lower tax, lower welfare society’ 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer, 2015, p. 35). The victory though, was somewhat hollow, 
because only some of the changes to tax credits announced in the summer budget (the 
reduction in the earnings threshold and the increase in the earnings taper) were revoked; 
equivalent changes to universal credit, which, with the exception of the North of Ireland, is 
currently be rolled out in Britain, made in the summer budget were not changed in the 
Autumn Statement and changes to other social welfare benefits for working age people were 
not revoked. Hence, the OBR’s (2015, p. 6) conclusion that by 2020 the ‘tax credit reversal is 




The main observations of the summer budget, however, arguably underestimate the 
importance of, and potential problems with, the changes to wage supplements and regulated 
wages announced in the summer budget. Such issues are considered in the following section.  
 
Increasing the NMW, retrenching tax credits and wage poverty 
The idea of a ‘living wage’ is superficially attractive, for it holds the impression that it will 
deliver to working people an income that has at least some relationship to their subsistence 
needs (the ‘living’ element of it) and the way it has been calculated relating wages to a Basic 
Living Costs approach in London and a Minimum Income Standard outside of it for living 
wage campaigns in Britain supports this notion. However, because in these two instances the 
‘living wage’ is calculated for different configurations of households and then reduced to an 
average, they are not particularly sensitive to household need (Grover, 2005; Bennett, 2014).  
 
What is described by the government as the ‘National Living Wage’ does not suffer 
from such problems because it is not related to even an average notion of subsistence, but to 
an arbitrary proportion (60 percent) of median wages. The reason this target was chosen is 
linked to the politics of the summer budget. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, for example, 
told parliament (House of Commons Debates, 2015, col. 338), it ‘is the minimum level of pay 
recommended in the report to the Resolution Foundation by Sir George Bain, the man the last 
Labour Government appointed as the first chair of the Low Pay Commission’. In accepting a 
measure of the ‘living wage’ as a proportion of median hourly earnings, however, the 
government obfuscated matters by conflating the notion of a subsistence wage (the ‘living 
wage’) with the Bain committee’s focus upon what was essentially a low pay threshold 
approach (Resolution Foundation, 2014). The Bain committee’s suggestion of increasing the 
NMW to an internationally accepted measure of low pay was estimated to have the likely 
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effect of reducing the proportion of employees receiving low wages from 21 to 17 percent 
(Resolution Foundation, 2014). Reducing the proportion of wage workers who can be 
considered to be low paid, however, is a very different exercise to developing a ‘living wage’, 
which, in contemporary configurations has some (albeit distant) relationship to notions of 
subsistence. The low pay threshold approach does not, and, therefore, it is even more difficult 
to see how the ‘National Living Wage’ can be understood as a ‘living wage’ compared, for 
example, to those described as such by the Living Wage Commission (2014) and Greater 
London Economics (2014). 
 
As a consequence, increases in the minimum wage will be a poor replacement for the 
loss of collectively provided wage supplements that attempted to relate income to subsistence 
needs by taking into account in their calculation the number of household members as a 
proxy for need (Grover, 2005). In this sense, while tax credits (and their replacement 
universal credit) are arguably more concerned with economic issues (such as the supply of 
labour) than social issues (such as poverty), they are nonetheless redistributive, although not 
necessarily to the poorest (Piachaud and Sutherland, 2000). As noted, however, the increase 
in the NMW is to be accompanied by a significant retrenchment of wage supplements for 
people in low paid wage work. In addition to the changes outlined above, this includes for 
families with more than two dependent children the decoupling of universal credit from 
household need by restricting its payment to only two children even if they have more than 
two. In this context, it is clear that the predistributive approach of increasing the NMW will 
be even more inadequate than the previous redistributive approach of using tax credits to 
deliver higher incomes to households where wage workers are in low paid work. The 
Conservative government’s approach of increasing the NMW while retrenching wage 
supplements is a particularly weak version of predistribution which entrenches, rather than 
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challenges, economic inequality. Through the increasing emphasis it places upon wages as 
income, it helps to reproduce exploitative class relationships, and also, as we shall see in the 
following section, unequal gender relations. 
 
Wage supplements, regulated minimum wages and the breadwinner wage model 
In the previous section the focus was upon the implications of the summer budget changes to 
wage supplements and the NMW in relation to horizontal redistribution. It is also the case, 
however, that the shifting nature of policy for wage poor households from wage supplements 
to an increased NMW has implications for the vertical redistribution of financial resources, 
most notably between men and women. This section suggests that the announcements in the 
summer budget are also important as a means of illuminating policy elite perceptions of 
gender relations in couple households and, in turn, of their relationship to wage work. 
 
There have been concerns for many years about the gender implications of what is 
generically known as the male breadwinner model, which through various policy actors has 
had several incarnations, for instance, the ‘living wage’ and the ‘family wage’ (Land, 1980; 
Bennett, 2014). What these approaches to understanding the level at which wages should be 
set have in common is the view that full time wages should be adequate enough to fulfil the 
subsistence needs of two adults and at least two children. While in more recent years notions 
of the ‘living wage’ have been gender-neutral in tone, even they cannot get away from the 
fact that they are premised upon there being at least one full time wage earner in couple 
households who, on current practice in Britain, is likely to be male. As Bennett (2014, p. 5) 





In this context, the announcements in the summer budget have potentially 
contradictory consequences for understanding relationships of economic dependency between 
men and women in couple households. As women are paid less than men they tend to be the 
main beneficiaries of increases in regulated minimum wages. This was the case when Trade 
Boards were introduced in Britain in 1909 and when the NMW was introduced there nine 
decades later (Grover, forthcoming, 2016). It will also be the case when the NMW is 
increased between 2016 and 2020. The implication is that not only will women wage workers 
be financially better off after the increases in the NMW, but that more women should be 
encouraged to take wage work because they will earn more than they would have done in 
previous years. In the context of retrenched wage supplements, which at least for children in 
the case of tax credits, are paid to women in couple households, this might be the only way in 
which women in such households gain some control over financial resources. It also 
potentially acts against the argument, used by governments of both the left and right since the 
1970s, that the payment of wage supplements to mothers can act as a means of discouraging 
them from doing wage work (Grover, forthcoming, 2016). In this interpretation, rather than 
limiting the supply of female labour, the changes to tax credits and the NMW can be 
understood as seeking to widen the wage relationship to a larger pool of female labour. 
 
A difficulty with this argument is that for a range of moral (such as notions of ‘good’ 
mothering) and pragmatic reasons (for instance, accessing affordable childcare, the number 
and age of their children) many women do not do wage work (Duncan and Edwards, 1999). 
For such women in wage poor couple households wage supplements are an important source 
of income over which they have control, even if they do not represent an independent income 
for those women. In this sense, wage supplements were an important source of vertical 
redistribution – a collective payment via the ‘purse’, rather than via the ‘wallet’. The problem 
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is, as seen above, the summer budget can be understood as being influenced by 
predistribution rather than redistribution. This means the increase in the NMW, along with 
the contemporaneous retrenchment of wage supplements, will shift resources within many 
wage poor households from women to men, thereby reinforcing patterns of patriarchal 
dependency via the male breadwinner model of wages and the unequal intra-household 
distribution of economic resources. 
 
In addition, in England and Wales at least, the new wage supplement, universal credit 
breaks with the principle, which had to be fought for in the 1940s, that women should receive 
state financial support for children3. Under universal credit households will have to nominate 
its recipient. Concern has been expressed that in many households men will unilaterally make 
the decision to receive any payments, leaving women with control over few household 
financial resources and less money being spent on children, an issue, it is argued, exacerbated 
by it not being made clear that at least part of the universal credit payment is for children 
(Annesley and Bennett, 2011). 
 
Conclusion 
The summer budget was described by the Chancellor of the Exchequer as a budget for the 
working people of Britain. However, despite, and more probably because of, these 
developments many low paid workers will be impoverished by the summer budget. This is 
because the increase in the NMW bears no relation to household need and involves severe 
cuts to the mechanism (universal credit) which is replacing tax credits as the means of 




Both the parliamentary left and right subscribe to the view that the best means of 
tackling poverty is for people to take wage work. This is especially so in the case of the 
Conservative Party which since being in government from 2010 (albeit in a Coalition 
between 2010 and 2105) has consistently argued that poverty can only be reduced by tackling 
it causes (primarily wage worklessness), rather than its consequences (a lack of income). The 
summer budget is consistent with such arguments, but it also demonstrates their vacuousness. 
The logic of the argument – expressed, for example, in the government’s proposal to 
effectively abolish the Child Poverty Act 2010 and replace it with ‘reporting obligations’, one 
of which is focused upon the proportion of people in wage work (Kennedy, 2015) – is that 
people in wage work can never be poor. Histories of the capitalist labour process demonstrate 
this is not the case, and in this context the summer budget can be understood as a 
reincarnation of the classic liberal economic argument that individuals must be responsible 
for their own and, if they have one, their family’s subsistence. Hence, it can be argued that 
the adoption of the predistributive increase in the NMW, alongside the cuts to wage 
supplements, goes further than suggesting that predistribution is merely a means of justifying 
austerity. In contrast, in the concerns discussed in this commentary predistribution can be 
understood as being part of an ideological assault upon the size and scope of collective state 
provision, the consequences of which the poorest wage working (and workless) people will 
have to live with for generations to come. 
 
The problem with the idea of predistribution is its attractiveness to policy elites 
because of its reliance upon markets as a distributor of ‘its rewards’, primarily via wage 
work4. While the emphasis in predistribution may be upon increasing the ‘reward’ from wage 
work, it does little to challenge the exploitative and economically unequal social relations 
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upon which capitalism is premised. These need to be challenged if policies, such as those in 




credit-cuts-to-affect-three-million-Brits.html (accessed 10 February 2016). 
2. http://www.resolutionfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Tax-credit-event-
slides-Full.pdf (accessed 10 February 2016). 
3. In the North of Ireland it has been agreed that when universal credit is introduced 
there will be no default position on its payment, allowing for split payments between 
couples. In the case of Scotland, while universal credit remains a reserved benefit, the 
Smith Commission proposed that the Scottish parliament should have the power to 
split payments between couples (Wilson and Kennedy, 2015). 
4. Joseph Hacker, for instance, is quoted as saying that predistribution denotes ‘the way 
in which the market distributes its rewards in the first place’ 
(http://www.progressonline.org.uk/2012/09/14/from-redistribution-to-predistribution/, 
accessed 10 February 2016). 
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